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INTRODUCTION 
 Jeremiah Ray Hart planned a robbery with Erick Michael Burwell. The 
plan was to set up a fake drug deal, take the seller to a secluded area, and 
Hart would take the drugs at gunpoint.  
 Hart borrowed a 9 mm Glock with an extended magazine from his 
cousin. Burwell found two brothers willing to sell them five pounds of 
marijuana. But when Hart pulled out the gun, one of the sellers pulled his 
gun and shot Hart, grazing his chin, neck and shoulder. Hart placed his gun 
against the chest of the seller who shot him and Hart fired, killing him. Hart 
accidentally left the extended magazine at the murder scene, along with a 
trail of blood. 
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 After a six-day jury trial, Hart was convicted of aggravated murder, 
obstruction of justice, and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person. On appeal Hart argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not 
moving for a mistrial at three different points during trial: 1) when a forensic 
firearms examiner referred to a gun that officers confiscated from Hart but 
ultimately found to be unconnected to this case; 2) when Hart’s cousin 
referred to Hart serving time in prison with him; and 3) when the jury asked 
for clarification about who owned a jacket that was tested for DNA and 
whose DNA was found on it. Hart also argues that counsel was ineffective 
for not objecting to the case manager’s opinion testimony about who the 
source of blood was for some of the bloodstains at the crime scene. 
 Counsel reasonably chose not to ask for a mistrial. Counsel could 
reasonably conclude that, had a mistrial been granted, Hart likely would 
have faced damning 404(b) evidence in the new trial that he did not face in 
the present trial because of an agreement by the State to avoid postponing 
trial. The 404(b) evidence showed that Hart and Burwell planned and tried to 
execute a robbery about two months before the murder, where Burwell set 
up a drug deal and Hart brought a gun to rob the sellers. Counsel could 
reasonably decide that none of the alleged problems would warrant a 
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mistrial, or that even if they did, they were not egregious enough to justify 
creating a real risk that Hart would face the 404(b) evidence on retrial.  
 Instead of risking that, counsel pursued other reasonable options. 
Counsel got the forensic firearms examiner to clarify that the gun he had 
referred to was used for comparison purposes and had no connection to this 
case. Counsel used the cousin’s statements about being Hart’s prison cellmate 
to undermine the cousin’s testimony against Hart, getting the cousin to admit 
that he had the opportunity to read Hart’s legal file while in prison and 
familiarize himself with the facts of the case. And counsel agreed to an 
instruction directing the jury to rely on its memory of the DNA evidence. 
 Regarding the case manager’s testimony, counsel reasonably chose to 
use cross-examination and his own expert testimony to undermine the case 
manager’s opinion about the source of bloodstains at the crime scene and 
parlayed that into a broader attack on the State’s investigation of the case. 
Hart has also failed to show prejudice—that is, that an objection would have 
succeeded in excluding the testimony and that it would have made a 
difference if it was. 
 Because Hart has not shown that counsel was ineffective, this Court 
should affirm. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 1. Was counsel ineffective by not asking for a mistrial when: 
 a) a forensic firearms examiner referred to a gun he received for testing 
but that was not connected to this case? 
 b) a key witness implied he was Hart’s prison cellmate, and counsel 
used the statement to undermine the witness’s testimony? 
 c) the jury asked a question during deliberations seeking clarification 
about DNA evidence? 
 2. Was counsel ineffective for not objecting to the case manager’s 
testimony interpreting the bloodstain evidence and instead using that 
testimony to undermine the State’s investigation? 
 3. Does the cumulative effect of the foregoing allegations raise a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for Hart? 
 Standard of Review. When a defendant argues for the first time on appeal 
that his counsel was ineffective, there is no ruling for an appellate court to 
review and the court “must decide whether the defendant was deprived of 
effective assistance as a matter of law.” State v. Scott, 2017 UT App 74, ¶18, 
397 P.3d 837, cert. granted, 406 P.3d 250 (Utah 2017). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of Facts 
 Erick Michael Burwell needed money to buy drugs, so he planned a 
robbery. R3321, 3327, 3486–87. He asked Jeremiah Ray Hart to help and Hart 
agreed. R3328–29. The plan was for Burwell to find someone who would sell 
a large quantity of marijuana, Burwell would tell them the buyer (Hart) was 
a friend coming from out of state, Burwell and Hart would drive with the 
seller to a secluded place near a freeway for a quick getaway, Hart would pull 
a gun and order the seller out of the car, and Burwell and Hart would drive 
off with the drugs. R3321, 3324–25, 3328–29, 3339–40, 3342, 3349, 3352–53, 
3476, 4192–93, 4195.  
 Through a “parade of middlemen” who thought they were involved in 
a legitimate drug deal, Burwell found someone to sell them five pounds of 
marijuana—brothers Malcom and Christian McDonald. R3321–22, 3327, 
3329–30, 3537–40, 3356–58, 3576–81, 3601–03, 3638–41, 4073–76, 4457. Malcom 
had sold marijuana with Christian several times in the past, but usually in 
much smaller quantities and usually to people they knew. R4072–74, 4104. 
Because they were selling a large quantity to a stranger, both Malcom and 
Christian brought guns with them. R4075–76, 4101, 4104. 
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 Burwell met the McDonalds for the first time in the Red Lobster 
parking lot in Sugarhouse. R3427, 4077–80. Burwell said they had to go pick 
up the buyer, who was having dinner with his wife nearby, and then they 
would drive somewhere to do the deal. R3341–42. Burwell insisted that they 
take his car. R3339–41. Reluctantly, the McDonalds agreed. R4080. Malcom 
got in the back driver-side seat, and Christian got in the front passenger seat, 
which was reclined somewhat. R3343, 3490–91; SE141. They drove to the 
Olive Garden parking lot in another section of the same shopping center, and 
Hart got in the back passenger-side seat, behind Christian. R3344–45. 
 Concealed in his jacket pocket, Hart had a 9 mm Glock with an 
extended magazine. R3353, 4085–86, 4112–13; SE11; DE4. Hart had shown it 
to Burwell earlier that evening. R3353, 3471. Hart borrowed the gun that day 
from his cousin, Kary Carter, who had loaded the magazine with a variety of 
hollow point and roundnose 9 mm bullets. R3685–87, 3934–35; SE12. 
 After Hart got in the car, the group left the shopping center parking lot 
and drove to a neighborhood just moments away. SE140. As they were 
driving, Hart asked Malcom, “Does it weigh?” R3447. Malcom confirmed that 
it did, and he opened a backpack containing the marijuana so Hart could 
check the quality. R3447, 3350, 4084. Burwell turned onto the first side street 
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south of I-80, flipped the car around so it was pointing east and he could 
quickly get to the onramp, and stopped the car. R3348–50, 3362; SE140. 
 As Burwell stopped, Hart pulled out his gun and pointed it at 
Malcom’s head. R3355, 4085–86. “[I]t’s a jack move,” Hart said. “[E]verybody 
out of the car.” R3353–54, 3451. Malcom froze, but Christian started moving 
for his gun. R3354, 4087. Hart reached around the front seat with his left arm 
wrapped around Christian’s neck or chest, and he pointed his gun at 
Christian, ordering him out of the car. R3452–54, 4087–88. Christian started 
to comply, so Hart lowered his gun. R3494–95. But as Christian turned to 
open the door, he drew his gun, pointed it toward Hart, and shot. R3454–58. 
The bullet grazed the left side of Hart’s chin, neck, and shoulder, piercing his 
shirt but not exiting it. R4014–17, 4248; SE90–97. 
 Christian was still turned toward Hart but was halfway out of the car. 
R3356–58, 3360–62. Reaching over the seat, Hart placed the muzzle of his gun 
against Christian’s chest and fired. R3355–57, 3360–62, 3815–16, 3820–21, 
4087–88; SE82–86. The bullet pierced Christian’s chest, fracturing a rib; 
lacerating the right lobe of his lung, the pericardial sac, the right atrium of his 
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heart, and the ascending aorta; and fracturing a rib as it exited near his spine. 
R3824–26.1 
 Clutching his chest, Christian got out of the car. R3359. He walked 
briefly to the west, away from the car, before collapsing in the gutter. R3788–
89, 3828–29, 4116. A woman found him not long afterward, and a doctor with 
extensive ER experience who lived nearby began performing CPR, but 
Christian died at the hospital. R3503–09, 3784–85, 3789–90, 3813. 
 Hart had also gotten out of the car, and Burwell drove off, thinking 
Malcom had gotten out as well. R3355, 3358, 3362. Burwell was surprised by 
the shooting, but when he realized that Malcom was still in the car he feigned 
surprise at the robbery to keep up the ruse. R3340, 3366. Still in shock, 
Malcom just asked Burwell to drop him off at his apartment, where he hid 
the marijuana and his gun until he could get rid of them. R3363–66, 4092, 
4142. 
 It is unclear how long Hart stayed at the scene when he got out of the 
car, but when he left, he left a trail of blood for about two blocks. R3697–3702, 
3738–39, 3856, 3874–75, 3877; SE26–65. Hart called his cousin, Carter, who 
                                              
1 The sequence of the two shootings was unclear. Malcom remembered 
Hart shooting Christian when he had him pinned against the seat. He did not 
see Christian shoot Hart, though he acknowledged that he may have heard 
two shots. R4089, 4106–08. 
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came and picked him up and took him to the hospital. R3936–38. On the way, 
Hart told Carter that “the dude shot [me] first … and [I] shot back.” R3947. 
Hart also told Carter that he had dropped the extended magazine back at the 
scene. R3945; see also R3353, 3685, 3934, 3939, 4086, 4271; SE10–11. Hart left 
the rest of the gun on the floor of the back seat of Carter’s car, and Carter got 
rid of it the next day. R3939–41, 3945. 
 At the hospital, an officer spoke with Hart about his wound. R3998–
4001. Hart first said he was at a park with his wife when two guys approached 
them, robbed them, and shot Hart. R4000. He then named a different park 
and said he got robbed and shot when he walked away from his wife to go 
behind a restroom. R4000–01. Officers investigating the homicide later came 
to speak with Hart, but Hart was uncooperative. R4203–05; SE124, 1/25/15 
Interview.  
 After leaving the hospital the next day, Hart visited a friend and told 
her that he would be leaving for Texas soon and asked if she wanted to come 
with him. R3993–94. He said he thought the officers were “building a case” 
against him. R3993. When his friend asked about Hart’s wounds, Hart said 
he had handled some business, adding that “the other person was worse off,” 
and “some people just need to act right.” R3991–92.  
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 When officers next spoke to Hart, Hart told them that Carter was 
giving him a ride somewhere when Carter made a stop in Sugarhouse and 
got out of the car to talk to someone; after a while Hart got out to see what 
was going on, and someone shot him so he turned and ran away. SE124, 
1/29/15 Interview, Episode 1.1. The clear implication was that Carter then 
shot the other person (Christian).  
 But Hart had told his sister on a jail call that Carter “wasn’t even there.” 
SE100, File 4. Carter never agreed to let Hart implicate him in a murder. 
R3948–49, 3951. But before he knew that Christian had died, Carter had 
agreed with Hart that he could use Carter’s name to buy some time. R3941–
42, 3947–49, 3963. Carter did so because he was suffering from several serious 
illnesses, was facing extensive prison time for other offenses, was suicidal, 
and “really didn’t care.” R3929–32, 3941, 3947, 3969. 
 The next time Hart spoke to police, he told a different story. He said he 
was at dinner in Sugarhouse with his wife and Carter when Burwell called 
him saying he had some money to pay back a debt he owed Hart. SE124, 
2/25/19 Interview, Part I, Selection 2 at 1:30–3:15. Hart had been arguing 
with Carter and wanted to leave, so he asked Burwell for a ride. SE124, 
2/25/19 Interview, Part I, Selection 2 at 4:50–6:15. Burwell picked him up, 
and there were two strangers in the car—the McDonald brothers. SE124, 
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2/25/19 Interview, Part I, Selection 2 at 6:15–6:45. They had not driven far 
when Malcom pulled out a gun with an extended magazine and pointed it at 
Hart. SE124, 2/25/19 Interview, Part I, Selection 2 at 6:15–8:00; Selection 5. 
The two fought over the gun until Christian turned and shot Hart. SE124, 
2/25/19 Interview, Part I, Selection 2 at 6:40–9:00. Hart got out and ran. 
SE124, 2/25/19 Interview, Part II, Selection 2 at 1:45–2:30. He said Malcom’s 
gun could have gone off and hit Christian when they were fighting over it, 
but he said he did not really know how Christian got shot. SE124, 2/25/19 
Interview, Part I, Selection 3. 
B. Summary of Proceedings 
 The State charged Hart with aggravated murder, a first degree felony; 
obstruction of justice, a second degree felony; and possession of a firearm by 
a restricted person, a second degree felony. R1–2. It charged Burwell with 
murder, aggravated robbery, and obstruction of justice. R3317. In exchange 
for his truthful testimony in this case, the State agreed to let Burwell plead to 
manslaughter and robbery and it dismissed the obstruction charge. R3317. 
 Before trial, the State provided notice that it intended to admit evidence 
under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. R421–23. Hart and Burwell had 
planned and attempted to execute a robbery just 54 days before the robbery 
in this case. R850. The plan was similar to this robbery: Burwell set up a drug 
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deal, Hart brought a black gun with an extended magazine, and they tried to 
rob the seller. R849–50. That robbery failed when the victims fought back. 
R850. But Hart did not shoot the victims; instead, he fled the scene, leaving 
behind a beanie that officers later confirmed had his DNA on it. R850–51. The 
trial court ruled that the evidence satisfied rule 404(b) and could be admitted 
to prove intent, motive, plan, absence of mistake, and lack of accident. R848–
55. After the trial court ruled that the 404(b) evidence would come in, Hart 
successfully persuaded this Court to grant a petition for interlocutory appeal. 
R1739. This Court’s ruling came 14 days before trial. R1739, 1760. Hart moved 
to stay proceedings in the trial court pending the outcome of the appeal, but 
the State agreed not to present the 404(b) evidence so the trial could move 
forward and the appeal was dismissed. R1741, 1760–61, 1789, 1941. 
 At trial, the State presented testimony from Burwell, Carter, Malcom, 
five people who helped arrange the drug deal, Hart’s friend whom he visited 
after leaving the hospital, the woman who found Christian lying in the gutter, 
the doctor who performed CPR, the medical examiner, a bloodstain pattern 
expert, a forensic firearms examiner, two forensic DNA analysts, the first 
officer who responded to the crime scene, the officer who processed the crime 
scene, the officer who conducted the initial hospital interview, and the 
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detective who served as the case manager who conducted the remaining 
interviews with Hart.  
 Hart presented testimony from a forensic scientist. Hart’s defense 
centered on challenging the adequacy of the State’s investigation and 
undermining the credibility of the main witnesses against him—Carter, 
Malcom, and Burwell. R4442–50, 4452–53, 4457, 4459, 4461. Consistent with 
Hart’s final interview, his theory of the case was that Burwell and the 
McDonalds were working together and that Christian was shot when 
Malcom and Hart were fighting over the gun. R4455–59, 4463–65. 
 The jury convicted Hart of aggravated murder, finding through a 
special verdict that the murder was committed in the course of an attempted 
aggravated robbery. R1987–88. The jury also convicted Hart of obstruction of 
justice and possession of a firearm. R1987. The court then found that Hart was 
a restricted person based on prior convictions. R4516. The court later 
sentenced Hart to consecutive terms of 25 years to life for aggravated murder 
and one to 15 years each for obstruction of justice and possession of a firearm 
by a restricted person. R2053. The court ordered the sentences to run 
consecutively with a prior sentence because Hart committed the present 
offenses while on parole. R2053, 4516, 4570. Hart timely appealed. R2055. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 I. Hart argues that his counsel was ineffective for not requesting a 
mistrial at three separate points during trial.  
 But counsel had a strong incentive not to ask for a mistrial—avoiding 
damning 404(b) evidence about a prior, strikingly similar robbery that Hart 
and Burwell planned and tried to carry out. Counsel had secured an 
agreement from the State that it would not use the evidence at trial so that 
the trial was not postponed. But a new trial would put the 404(b) evidence 
back into play. Counsel could reasonably conclude that a mistrial would not 
be worth the risk of facing the 404(b) evidence in a new trial, particularly 
given the weak bases for seeking a mistrial and the availability of other 
options at each of the three points at which Hart says counsel should have 
moved for a mistrial. 
 First, Hart argues that a mistrial was warranted when the forensic 
firearms examiner referred to a second gun received in this case. The second 
gun was confiscated from Hart when he was arrested about a month after the 
murder, but the examiner excluded it as the murder weapon in this case. 
 Counsel could reasonably conclude that this did not present a basis for 
a mistrial—particularly not one egregious enough to justify the risk of a new 
trial with the 404(b) evidence. The forensic firearms examiner did not connect 
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the gun to Hart. He simply said he received the gun for testing. This 
statement was easily cured by a stipulation, whereby the witness clarified 
that the gun was used only for comparison purposes to demonstrate the types 
of markings different handguns leave on shell casings, and that the gun was 
not connected to this case. 
 Second, Hart argues that counsel should have asked for a mistrial 
when Carter suggested that he and Hart were cellmates in prison. Again, 
counsel could conclude that a mistrial was not warranted—and the testimony 
certainly was not egregious enough to justify the costs of a mistrial in this 
case. Carter did not explicitly name Hart when he made two passing 
references to incarceration. Hart argues that counsel was unprepared for 
Carter’s testimony and was deficient when he asked questions that Carter 
responded to by mentioning Hart’s incarceration. But Hart has not pointed 
to any record evidence to establish that counsel did not prepare, and Carter 
volunteered the information despite counsel’s best efforts to word his 
questions carefully to avoid it.  
 Furthermore, counsel reasonably decided to use Carter’s statements to 
his advantage. Counsel asked Carter details about the incarceration to 
highlight that Carter had the opportunity to read Hart’s legal papers in this 
case, implying that Carter could have fabricated his testimony in a way that 
-16- 
aligned with the State’s case in hopes of gaining leniency from the State. This 
approach was reasonable because Carter’s testimony that he gave Hart a gun 
with an extended magazine was particularly damaging to Hart and Hart 
needed some way to try to discredit Carter’s testimony. 
 Third, Hart argues that counsel should have moved for a mistrial when 
the jury asked a question that he says exhibited confusion about a stipulation 
addressing DNA testing of Hart’s jacket. Hart’s DNA was found on the left 
sleeve of Hart’s jacket, and Christian’s DNA was excluded. The DNA analyst 
testified about the result but not the ownership of the jacket. A stipulation 
was read into the record stating that the jacket belonged to Hart, and the case 
manager later testified to the same effect. But during deliberations, the jury 
asked whom the jacket belonged to and whose DNA was found on it. With 
input from counsel, the court referred the jury back to its collective memory 
of the stipulation. 
 This claim is inadequately briefed and the Court should not address it. 
Hart never explains how the jury’s question establishes that a fair trial could 
not be had and that a mistrial would have been appropriate. Nor does he 
explain why counsel was deficient for not moving for a mistrial. In any event, 
such a commonplace occurrence as a jury question asking for clarification 
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would not justify a mistrial, especially given the high cost of a mistrial in this 
case. 
 Finally, Hart has not shown a reasonable likelihood that any mistrial 
motion would have been granted. Thus, he has not proven prejudice. 
 II. Hart argues that counsel should have objected to the case manager’s 
testimony that he believed Hart was the source of the bloodstain furthest to 
the east at the crime scene. Hart argues that the testimony was inadmissible 
under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, and that the State had not given 
notice. 
 Regardless of admissibility, counsel had a clear, reasonable strategy to 
use the case manager’s testimony to undermine his believability and to 
question the thoroughness of the State’s investigation. Counsel got the case 
manager to admit that he could not be sure of the identity of the bloodstain’s 
source without doing DNA testing, and that he had time to test it in this case 
but did not. 
 Hart has not proven prejudice because he has not proved that an 
objection would have excluded the testimony. He has not shown that the case 
manager was unqualified or that the testimony was unreliable. And the 
expert-notice statute does not apply because the case manager is an employee 
of a political subdivision of the state. Also, at best Hart would have been 
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entitled to a continuance under the expert-notice statute, but he did not need 
one because, as the record shows, counsel was prepared to thoroughly cross-
examine the case manager.  
 Furthermore, whether the bloodstain came from Hart was ultimately 
unimportant. Its only relevance came from establishing how close Hart was 
to the extended magazine that was left at the scene. But two witnesses saw 
Hart shoot Christian with a gun that had an extended magazine. A third 
witness who was not there said he gave the gun with the extended magazine 
to Hart and Hart returned the gun without the magazine. And the first people 
on the scene saw the extended magazine much closer to where Hart 
indisputably was, compared to where the magazine ended up when officers 
photographed the scene. 
 III. Finally, Hart argues that the cumulative effect of counsel’s 
deficiencies justifies reversal. 
 But Hart has not shown any deficiency, so the cumulative-error 
doctrine has no effect. 
ARGUMENT 
 All of Hart’s claims challenge his trial counsel’s representation. To 
show that his counsel was ineffective, Hart must prove both that his counsel 
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performed deficiently and that he was prejudiced as a result. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–89, 694 (1984).  
 To prove deficient performance, Hart must show that “no competent 
attorney” would have proceeded as his counsel did. Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 
115, 124 (2011). That analysis does not turn on a binary consideration of 
whether counsel’s actions were strategic, Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 
481 (2000), or whether a forgone objection would have succeeded, see State v. 
Bedell, 2014 UT 1, ¶¶21–25, 322 P.3d 697. Rather, the analysis examines 
“whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the 
circumstances.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 
1045–51 (10th Cir. 2002). In other words, Strickland’s deficient performance 
analysis requires courts to take a holistic view of counsel’s actions, 
considering reasonableness in view of the totality of the situation counsel 
faced. Further, that analysis begins with “a ‘strong presumption’ that 
counsel’s representation was within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable 
professional assistance.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011). Hart 
must rebut that presumption with affirmative evidence. See Burt v. Titlow, 571 
U.S. 12, 23 (2013). 
 To prove that he suffered prejudice, Hart must show that there is “a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 
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of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. And 
to prove cumulative harm, Hart must show more than one instance of 
deficient performance and that “‘the cumulative effect of the several errors 
undermines [the court’s] confidence ... that a fair trial was had.’” See State v. 
Martinez-Castellanos, 2018 UT 46, ¶39, 428 P.3d 1038 
I. 
Counsel acted reasonably in not moving for a mistrial 
given the high cost of and the weak justifications for a 
mistrial in this case; further, Hart has not shown a 
reasonable likelihood that a mistrial would have been 
granted. 
 Hart argues that counsel should have moved for a mistrial at three 
different points during trial: when the forensic firearms examiner referred to 
two guns he received in this case, when Carter indicated that he was 
incarcerated with Hart, and when the jury asked for clarification of the 
evidence during deliberations. 
 Hart has proved neither deficient performance nor prejudice. “[T]he 
trial court should not grant a mistrial except where the circumstances are 
such as to reasonably indicate that a fair trial cannot be had and that a mistrial 
is necessary in order to avoid injustice.” State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶325, 
299 P.3d 892. As discussed below, counsel could have reasonably decided 
that a mistrial motion was unlikely to succeed in any of the three 
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circumstances, and counsel had other reasonable options to deal with any 
problems. 
 But that is only half of the analysis. When considering whether to ask 
for a mistrial on any of the three points, one overarching consideration 
counsel would have faced in this case was the 404(b) evidence. This Court’s 
grant of interlocutory review on the eve of trial did not guarantee that Hart 
would ultimately prevail on the issue if the appeal had gone forward. But 
counsel secured a guarantee when the State agreed not to use the 404(b) 
evidence in this trial. In winning a mistrial, counsel would have lost that 
guarantee. Counsel surely would have weighed the risk that a mistrial would 
reopen the possibility that the 404(b) evidence would be admitted in the new 
trial. 
 While some grounds for a mistrial may justify facing such a risk, 
counsel could reasonably conclude that each ground asserted here did not, as 
discussed below. 
A. Hart has not proven that counsel was ineffective for not 
moving for a mistrial when a witness referred to a second 
firearm unconnected to this case. 
 Hart argues that his counsel should have moved for a mistrial when 
the forensic firearms examiner said that he had examined two guns that he 
received in this case. Br.Aplt. 25–31. While counsel successfully objected and 
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the State had the witness clarify that the second firearm was unrelated to this 
case, Hart argues that the correction was insufficient and a mistrial was 
warranted. Br.Aplt. 27, 30–31. 
 But whether a mistrial was warranted is not the relevant question for 
deficient performance. Rather, Hart must prove that all competent counsel 
would have moved for one. He has not met that burden. Counsel reasonably 
concluded that the witness’s correction of his earlier statement resolved the 
problem by unequivocally stating that the second gun was unaffiliated with 
this case and was relevant for comparison purposes only. Further, Hart has 
not proven prejudice because he has not shown a reasonable likelihood that 
a mistrial motion would have succeeded: no evidence connected the gun to 
Hart.  
1. Background 
 Officers investigating the scene of the shooting found Christian’s gun, 
a .45 caliber Taurus Millennium Pro PT145 handgun.2 R3688, 4076; SE16. The 
standard-sized magazine was still in place. R3689; SE17. They also found the 
bullet that shot Hart—an expended .45 caliber bullet with Hart’s DNA on it 
that was fired from Christian’s Taurus. R3692, 3862–63, 3889–91; SE22–23. 
                                              
2 Addendum C contains several of the gun-related exhibits discussed 
in this section. 
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 At the scene, officers also found an extended magazine from a Glock 
handgun, but the gun was not there. R3685. The extended magazine was 
about nine inches long and could hold 31 nine-millimeter cartridges. R3686; 
SE10–11. The magazine was loaded with fifteen cartridges of different styles 
and made by different manufacturers. R3686–87; SE12. A single spent 9 mm 
casing was also found at the scene. R3691; SE24–25.  
 No expended 9 mm bullet was found, R3692, and no other gun was 
found. Burwell testified that he did not have a gun. R3353. Malcom testified 
that he had a gun but never pulled it out. R4095. He later took his gun apart 
and scattered it in the west desert; although he took police there nine months 
later to look for it, they never found any of it. R4094–96, 4232. Malcom said 
his gun was a .40 caliber handgun, but he could not remember the make or 
model. R4075. And as noted, Carter testified that Hart dropped his gun in the 
back seat of his car and that Carter got rid of it. R3939–41. Officers never 
found that gun. R4258–59.3 
 When Hart was arrested about a month after the murder, he had a Kel-
Tec 9 mm handgun, not a Glock. R3892, 3897. A forensic firearms examiner 
                                              
3 Although Carter accurately described the magazine and the 
cartridges in it, he mistakenly said the gun was a .40 caliber. R3934. It was a 
9 mm. R3689. 
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with the Salt Lake City Police Department Crime Lab test fired a cartridge 
from the Kel-Tec, apparently to determine whether the expended 9 mm 
casing found at the murder scene could have been fired from the Kel-Tec. 
R3881, 3891–92. The impression made on the casing from the Kel-Tec did not 
match the impression on the casing found at the scene. R3891–92, 3922–23; 
SE122.  
 At trial, the forensic firearms examiner testified that he “examined [the 
Taurus] and another firearm that was submitted as well.” R3887. After 
questioning him about the Taurus, the prosecutor asked about State’s Exhibit 
122, a close-up photograph of the expended 9 mm casing from the scene next 
to another expended 9 mm casing. R3891–92; SE122. The witness explained 
that he took the photograph “to show the comparison of [the expended casing 
from the scene] … verses a test fired cartridge case from another firearm that 
I received.” R3891–92.  
 Trial counsel asked for a bench conference. R3892. Counsel pointed out 
to the court that the comparison was made using the Kel-Tec taken from Hart, 
and he objected to any reference tying the gun to Hart. R3892, 3895–96. The 
court agreed and cautioned the State: “I want to make clear you risk a 
mistrial” if “any evidence” presented to the jury indicates that the 
“comparison gun was obtained from the defendant.” R3899–3900. The 
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prosecutor agreed that such evidence would be a problem and he assured the 
court that he intended to use the exhibit solely to demonstrate that the 
expended shell found at the scene was fired from a Glock. R3895–99.  
 Counsel then argued that “the cat is out of the bag”—the witness 
referred to “a gun coming into evidence that we’re never going to talk about.” 
R3900–02. But the court disagreed. R3901–04. The court noted that the jury 
had not heard any evidence that “a gun [was] received from the defendant”—
a point with which counsel agreed. R3901. The court emphasized that “there 
is to be no testimony that this impression was made by a gun that had any 
connection to the defendant”—a point with which the prosecutor agreed. 
R3901–02. To resolve counsel’s concern, the court proposed having the 
prosecutor lead the witness to testify that the second gun was used for 
comparison purposes only and that it had no connection to this case. R3902–
04. Counsel agreed that this would resolve the issue. R3904, 3917–19. 
 When the witness took the stand again, the prosecutor complied with 
the stipulation: 
Q: I want to just make a few things clear just because we’ve 
been—a kind of long lunch break. But when we talk about two 
guns, one of those guns was a comparison gun just available to 
you in the lab; is that correct? 
 
A. That’s correct. 
 
Q. It is not affiliated with this case? 
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A. That’s correct. 
 
R3921. The witness then discussed the shape of the impression made by the 
firing pin on the casing found at the scene. R3922–23; SE122. He testified that 
the impression was made by a Glock, and to illustrate he pointed to the 
comparison casing that he created with the 9 mm comparison gun that was 
not a Glock. R3922–23.4 
2. A competent attorney could decide that the cure the parties 
agreed to was sufficient.  
 Hart has not shown that the host of factors counsel faced would require 
all competent attorneys to move for a mistrial.  
As counsel readily and correctly agreed, the jury did not hear any 
evidence tying the second gun to Hart. R3901. And even though the witness 
said he “received” the second gun and that it was “submitted” in this case, 
he later clarified—as a result of counsel’s objection—that the gun was not 
affiliated with this case and that it was used for purposes of comparison. 
R3887, 3891–92, 3921. Competent counsel could conclude that this was 
enough to safeguard Hart from being associated with the test-fired gun.   
                                              
4 On cross-examination, the witness conceded that there are other 
models of 9 mm guns that make impressions similar to Glocks when fired. 
R3923–24. 
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Even if the jury believed that the comparator gun had some connection 
to the case, the gun was shown to have produced markings on casings that 
were inconsistent with the markings on the casing found at the scene. SE122. 
In other words, if the jury connected the gun with Hart, it would not have 
inculpated him in the murder.5 
On this record then, competent counsel could conclude that as it played 
out, the risk to Hart’s right to a fair trial, if there were any at all, was too low 
to justify a mistrial, and that moving for one would have been unlikely to 
succeed. 
Against that low risk of prejudice to Hart, counsel would have weighed 
the cost of a mistrial. While a new jury in a retrial would not have heard an 
oblique reference to a second gun, it very well may have heard evidence of a 
                                              
5 Further, counsel could have reasonably concluded that, given the 
other evidence at trial, there was no risk that the jury’s determination of 
whether Hart possessed a gun would come down to this cryptic reference to 
a second firearm that was not the murder weapon. Malcom and Burwell, who 
met for the first time during the drug deal, and Carter, who apparently never 
met Malcom or Burwell, all testified that Hart had a gun with an extended 
magazine. R3353, 3357–58, 3427, 3933–38, 4080, 4086. And the extended 
magazine belonged to a Glock, which made markings on shell casings distinct 
from the markings that the second gun made. 3922–23; SE122. Again, the jury 
never heard any evidence connecting the second gun to Hart, and they heard 
explicit evidence that it was unconnected to this case. The reference to 
another gun unconnected to this case could not have had any effect on the 
jury’s consideration of whether Hart possessed a firearm. 
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second robbery that Hart and Burwell attempted, with Hart using the same 
gun that he used in this robbery.  
A competent attorney assessing these factors holistically could 
reasonably decide not to ask for a mistrial based on testimony that did not 
link his client to a gun that did not implicate his client in the murder.  
3. Hart has not proven a reasonable likelihood that a mistrial 
would have been granted. 
 Finally, Hart has not shown prejudice. To prove a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result, Hart would have to prove a reasonable 
likelihood that a mistrial motion would have been granted. See State v. Kelley, 
2000 UT 41, ¶26, 1 P.3d 546 (“Failure to raise futile objections does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”). For the reasons discussed 
above, the threat to Hart’s right to a fair trial approached zero. Hart therefore 
has not proved that there was a reasonable likelihood of the court granting a 
mistrial. See Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶325 (stating that mistrial is only to be 
granted when “a fair trial cannot be had” and “a mistrial is necessary in order 
to avoid injustice”). Hart thus suffered no prejudice when counsel did not 
move for a mistrial but got the witness to clarify that the gun that did not 
implicate Hart in the murder was nevertheless unrelated to this case. 
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B. Hart has not proven that counsel was ineffective when, instead 
of moving for a mistrial, counsel used a witness’s volunteered 
statements about Hart’s prior incarceration to undermine that 
witness’s testimony. 
 Hart argues that counsel did not prepare for Carter’s testimony and as 
a result was caught off guard when Carter indicated that he was in prison 
with Hart. Br.Aplt. 36, 40–42. He argues that counsel then “unnecessarily” 
“exacerbate[d] the situation” by highlighting that testimony rather than 
asking for a curative instruction or moving for a mistrial. Br.Aplt. 42. Hart 
argues that the testimony “could not help but predispose the jury to presume 
his guilt in the instant case.” Br.Aplt. 40, 43. 
 Hart has not overcome the presumption that counsel acted reasonably. 
Counsel’s actions demonstrate that he was prepared, and he reasonably 
decided—in consultation with Hart—to use Carter’s statements to 
undermine Carter’s testimony rather than moving for a mistrial or asking for 
a curative instruction. Furthermore, Hart has not proven prejudice because 
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he has not shown a reasonable likelihood that a mistrial would have been 
granted.6 
1. Background 
 During Carter’s cross-examination, trial counsel asked him about each 
of his three interviews with police. R3959–60. Through questioning, counsel 
highlighted Carter’s shifting accounts. Carter admitted that in his first 
interview, he said that he shot Christian, and when officers pressed him on 
it, he conceded that he and Hart had agreed that Carter would take the blame 
for shooting Christian. R3959. Carter admitted that during the second 
interview, he told police that Hart never told him that Hart shot anyone. 
R3959. But when counsel asked Carter whether Carter told police in the third 
interview that Hart said he shot someone, Carter responded by trying to 
explain his shifting accounts: 
[inaudible] both times I was still—I was still trying to protect 
him. We were out here in a situation where I’m going to prison 
[inaudible] same room [inaudible]. See, yeah, if I sat there and 
                                              
6 Hart also suggests that there was an “‘actual breakdown in the 
adversary process,’” leading to a presumption of prejudice. Br.Aplt. 43. Hart 
has not explained how counsel’s actions “entirely fail[ed] to subject the 
prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing,” or how they amounted 
to circumstances of similar “magnitude” to justify presuming prejudice. 
United States v. Chronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659–62 & n.26 (1984). And  Chronic’s 
presumed prejudice applies only when the failure is “‘entire[]’”; the 
exception will not apply for failing to oppose the state at specific points in the 
proceedings. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696–97 (2002). That is all Hart has 
alleged here. 
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I made up whatever to have to protect myself. So, yeah, at that 
time they had me in a cell with a person who was taking care 
of me. 
 
R3960. Counsel asked for a bench conference. R3960. The prosecutor noted 
that Carter had not explicitly identified Hart as the person he was in the same 
cell with, and he suggested that they not draw any more attention to it. R3960. 
Counsel agreed and resumed questioning on a different point. R3960.  
 Later, counsel tried to highlight Carter’s inconsistency in providing 
“three different motivations” for initially saying he shot Christian, then 
saying Hart never told him that anyone got shot, and finally saying Hart told 
him that he shot Christian. R3964–65. Counsel began by asking about Carter’s 
sense of indebtedness toward Hart, and Carter responded again by 
volunteering information about Hart’s criminal history: 
Q. All right. So and—without getting into details, I think you 
told me that—that Mr. Hart has taken care of you through a lot 




Q. And—and did he—he let you live with him before all this 
happened? 
 
A. Yeah. As soon as they’re violate—they violated his parole. 
 
Q. All right. You guys—before all of this happened, you two 





Q. —on the streets, yeah? And he—he helped take care of you, 
and for how long? How long in your life did Jeremiah Hart help 
take care of you? 
 
A. Do you think it’s a—a few times take care of a few situations 
when I was a kid and then just recently. And then I’ve been 
locked up the majority of my life, so it’s been off and on pretty 
much here and there. 
 
R3964.  
 Counsel asked the court for a brief recess, stating, “I need to talk to my 
client about what we’re going to do, whether I’m going to take it one direction 
or not.” R3965. The court declined to grant a recess in the middle of the 
witness’s testimony. R3965. So during the prosecutor’s redirect examination, 
counsel consulted with Hart about how and whether to address Carter’s 
references that Hart had been in prison. See R3976–77. 
 Counsel began his recross examination, “So elephant in the room, you 
and [Hart] spent a year in prison together after this happened, correct?” 
R3971. Counsel elicited information that Carter and Hart were cellmates, that 
Carter was in a wheelchair, and that Hart took care of Carter as his assigned 
ADA assistant. R3971–72. Counsel pressed Carter on whether he ever talked 
with Hart about this case while they were cellmates. R3972. Carter insisted 
that they “never sat down and had a conversation.” R3972. Counsel then 
pressed Carter about whether he ever read through any paperwork Hart had 
in his cell regarding this case. R3973–74. Carter was adamant that he never 
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looked through Hart’s legal papers, but he conceded that he had the 
opportunity, and counsel highlighted those opportunities—when Hart was 
working out, taking a shower, visiting the doctor, or attending court. R3973.  
 After Carter was done testifying, counsel made a record that he had 
made a strategic decision in consultation with Hart to use Carter’s reference 
to Hart’s incarceration. R3976–77.  
 In closing argument, counsel emphasized that Carter and Hart “spent 
a lot of time together in a cell with all of Jeremiah Hart’s legal papers right 
there with him.” R4461. Counsel repeated all the opportunities Carter would 
have had to look through Hart’s papers. R4461. And he argued that “having 
information about somebody’s case could actually be valuable” in prison, 
insinuating that Carter looked at the papers so he could craft his testimony in 
a way that coincided with the State’s case. R4461. 
2. A competent attorney could decide to use the volunteered 
statements about Hart’s incarceration to undermine a key 
witness’s testimony. 
 Hart has not overcome the presumption that his counsel adequately 
investigated the case and prepared to cross-examine Carter. “It should go 
without saying that the absence of evidence cannot overcome the ‘strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance.’” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 23 (2013). Hart has 
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pointed to no record evidence about counsel’s actual preparation in this case, 
and he has not sought a remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, to create a factual record of how counsel did or did not investigate 
and prepare for this case. The Court must therefore presume that counsel 
acted reasonably in preparing for trial. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  
 Nor has Hart overcome the presumption that counsel acted reasonably 
in his initial cross-examination of Carter. Carter’s first reference to being in 
prison “in a cell with a person who was taking care of me” came after a 
question that in no way called for such a response. R3960. Counsel had 
simply asked a leading question about what Carter said in his final interview. 
R3960. When counsel later asked questions that risked eliciting information 
about Carter and Hart being in prison together, counsel worded his questions 
carefully to avoid that response. First, he asked a leading question about 
whether Carter had said that Hart took care of him “through a lot of medical 
conditions”—and he said he wanted Carter to answer “without getting into 
details.” R3964. Carter showed that he could answer the question with a 
simple “Yeah.” R3964. Counsel then asked another leading question about 
whether Hart had let Carter live with him, and he specified that he was 
interested only in the time period “before all this happened.” R3964. But after 
answering “Yeah,” Carter added, “As soon as they’re violate—they violated 
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his parole.” R3964. Counsel again tried to refocus Carter’s response: “You 
guys—before all of this happened, you two lived together on … on the streets, 
yeah?” R3964.  
 Counsel had reasonably engaged in a line of questioning that would 
develop the “three different motivations” Carter mentioned for his shifting 
accounts, all in an effort to undermine Carter’s credibility and show 
inconsistencies. R3965.   
Hart argues that counsel could have taken “precautionary measures” 
to ensure that the information did not come out, such as having the court 
instruct Carter not to refer to Hart’s incarceration. Br.Aplt. 41–42. But counsel 
took precautionary measures. He crafted his questions in a way that should 
have avoided any reference to Hart’s incarceration. Carter was bent on 
talking about it and offered the testimony despite—not as a result of—
counsel’s best efforts to steer Carter away. Counsel cannot be deficient for not 
being able to control an opposing party’s witness. 
 Once the information was out, counsel acted reasonably in choosing to 
use it to Hart’s advantage rather than seeking a curative instruction or 
moving for a mistrial.  
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 Carter was a key prosecution witness. Both Burwell and Malcom 
testified that they saw Hart shoot Christian with a gun that had an extended 
magazine. R3353, 3358–62, 4086–88. An extended magazine from a 9 mm 
Glock was left behind at the scene. R3685–86; SE10–11. And a spent 9 mm 
casing with markings consistent with those made by a Glock was found at 
the scene. R3691, 3922–23; SE24–25, 122. Hart’s theory was that Burwell and 
Malcom were in cahoots, that the gun with the extended magazine was 
Malcom’s, and that Malcom had shot his brother when Hart and Malcom 
were fighting over the gun. R4456–59, 4463–65. 
But Hart’s theory was significantly undermined by Carter’s 
testimony—a witness with no connection to either Burwell or Malcom. Carter 
testified that he gave Hart the gun with the extended magazine. R3934. Carter 
even identified the types of bullets he had loaded in the magazine, which was 
consistent with the types of bullets officers found in the magazine left at the 
scene. See R3685–87, 3935; SE10–12. Carter also testified that Hart returned 
the gun without the magazine. R3939. None of counsel’s efforts to undermine 
Carter’s credibility could explain Carter’s knowledge about the details of the 
murder weapon. The best counsel could do was to point out one discrepancy 
in the details—Carter called the gun a .40 caliber when the extended 
magazine actually came from a 9 mm. R3689, 3934, 4458–59. 
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 Counsel reasonably concluded that Carter’s hinting at his incarceration 
with Hart gave counsel the opening he needed to more effectively challenge 
Carter’s testimony. Although Carter denied talking about the case with Hart 
or looking through his legal papers, counsel effectively emphasized the many 
opportunities Carter would have to familiarize himself with the details of 
Hart’s case over the year that the two were cellmates in prison. R3971–74. 
Earlier in cross-examination, counsel elicited that the prosecutor had agreed 
to send a “pretty glowing letter” to the Board of Pardons and Parole after 
Carter testified; Carter had a parole review date the next year and the 
prosecutor’s draft letter urged the Board to consider Carter’s cooperation, 
“grit and true character.” R3949–51; DE3. In closing argument counsel 
emphasized the opportunity Carter had to look through Hart’s legal papers, 
and he suggested that that kind of information would be “valuable” to 
someone in prison. R4461. 
 Counsel also could have concluded that under the facts of this case, 
there was little risk that the jury would assume Hart’s guilt just because he 
had a criminal history. Every player in this drama was involved in a crime; 
several had criminal histories. R3317–19, 3524–29, 3552–53, 3575–76, 3600, 
3655, 3927–29, 3985, 4070–71. Everyone but Burwell received use immunity 
for their testimonies in this case. SE132–39. Again, Hart’s theory was that 
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Burwell was working with the McDonald brothers, not Hart. R4456–59, 4463–
65. Hart emphasized that Malcom was dealing drugs, that he lied to police 
regarding their investigation of his brother’s death, and that he got rid of his 
gun. R4444–46, 4448, 4450. Burwell had just gotten out of prison, and he 
pleaded guilty to manslaughter and robbery for his role in Christian’s 
murder. R3317–19, 4447–48. Knowing that Hart had some unspecified 
criminal history that resulted in a prison sentence and that he had violated 
parole was not likely to have swayed the jury as it decided whom to believe. 
 Along with the potential benefit counsel could see in developing 
Carter’s testimony and the minimal risk, counsel had to weigh the costs and 
benefits of asking for a curative instruction or moving for a mistrial.  
 Competent counsel could have seen real risk in asking for a curative 
instruction. Carter’s volunteered references were not explicit. R3960, 3964. A 
curative instruction would draw more attention to the issue, without adding 
the kind of benefit that counsel could create through further questioning and 
argument on the point. Certainly, the route counsel chose carried some risk. 
But as argued above, that risk was minimal in a case where criminal activity 
was the norm among the fact witnesses. And counsel’s strategy carried the 
benefit of using Hart’s incarceration to his advantage rather than drawing 
attention to it through a curative instruction that lacked that advantage. A 
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competent attorney could choose the course Hart’s counsel chose. In fact, 
counsel presented this option to Hart, and Hart agreed to the strategy. R3976–
77.  
 And as argued above, counsel had to weigh the damage to Hart’s case, 
if any, against the costs of succeeding on a mistrial motion. Competent 
counsel could conclude that, on balance, spinning the testimony to support 
the defense was a better option than a new trial with potential 404(b) evidence 
that was even more damaging than the vague reference to Hart’s 
incarceration and parole violation.  
 Taking all of these factors into account, counsel reasonably decided not 
to move for a mistrial or request a curative instruction. Counsel’s decision—
made with Hart’s approval—was reasonable. “[A]n attorney must play the 
hand he or she is dealt, and an attorney’s decision about how to deal with 
adverse facts is the sort of thing that courts should not second-guess in the 
context of ineffective assistance claims.” State v. Garcia, 2017 UT App 200, ¶23, 
407 P.3d 1061. Furthermore, “strategic choices made after thorough 
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually 
unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Among all the options counsel 
faced, it was reasonable for counsel to decide to use Hart’s prior incarceration 
to explain how Carter could know about the extended magazine without 
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having given it to Hart. And that strategy became even more reasonable once 
Carter “blurted out” the evidence of Hart’s prior incarceration. Br.Aplt. 40. 
That counsel was ultimately unable to persuade the jury does not make 
counsel’s actions unreasonable. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 524 (Utah 
1994). 
3. Hart has not proven a reasonable likelihood that a mistrial 
would have been granted. 
 Finally, Hart has not shown prejudice. He has not shown a reasonable 
likelihood that a mistrial motion would have been granted had he asked for 
one instead of using Carter’s testimony about incarceration. As discussed 
above, the references to Hart’s incarceration and parole violation were veiled, 
referring only obliquely to Hart. They were volunteered by Carter, not 
elicited by counsel. And they were unlikely to sway the jury in a case where 
almost all the fact witnesses were involved in criminal activity. See State v. 
Allen, 2005 UT 11, ¶40, 108 P.3d 730 (“A review of our case law amply reveals 
that a mistrial is not required where an improper statement is not 
intentionally elicited, is made in passing, and is relatively innocuous in light 
of all the testimony presented.”); State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, ¶47, 27 P.3d 
1133 (concluding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
mistrial when witness made “a ‘vague,’ ‘fleeting’ remark” indicating that 
defendant may have had criminal history); State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 448 
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(Utah 1986) (acknowledging that “some prejudice might result” from “a 
single phrase, clearly elicited inadvertently, made during a three-day trial,” 
but mistrial requires “some showing that the verdict was substantially 
influenced by the challenged testimony”). Hart therefore has not proven that 
there was a reasonable likelihood of the court granting a mistrial had he asked 
for one rather than choosing to use the testimony. 
 And he suffered no prejudice when counsel used the incarceration 
references to Hart’s advantage rather than asking for a curative instruction. 
Again, knowing that Hart had some unspecified criminal history that 
resulted in a prison sentence and that he had violated parole was not likely 
to have swayed the jury as it decided whom to believe. Counsel was able to 
challenge Carter’s testimony by emphasizing that Carter had the opportunity 
to view Hart’s legal papers in this case while the two were cellmates, and 
suggesting that Carter had crafted his testimony to coincide with the State’s 
case so he could get favorable treatment from the State. Had counsel not used 
Hart’s incarceration to try to undermine Carter’s testimony, the State’s case 
would have been even stronger. 
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C. Hart has inadequately briefed his claim that counsel was 
ineffective for not moving for a mistrial when the jury asked a 
question during deliberations.  
 Hart argues that counsel was ineffective for not requesting a mistrial 
when the jury submitted a question during deliberations asking whose jacket 
sleeve was tested and whose DNA match was found on the left sleeve. 
Br.Aplt. 45. 
 This Court should decline to reach this issue because it is inadequately 
briefed. In any event, Hart has not shown that counsel was ineffective 
because counsel could reasonably choose not to move for a mistrial based on 
the commonplace occurrence of a jury asking for clarification—particularly 
when a mistrial carried such heavy costs in this case. 
 During trial, a forensic DNA analyst testified about the results of DNA 
tests she ran on the jacket that Hart was wearing the night of the murder, but 
she did not identify the jacket as Hart’s. R3859–61. The jacket was tested 
against a DNA sample known to belong to Christian and a sample known to 
belong to Hart. See R3859–61. The test of the right sleeve was inconclusive. 
R3860–61. The left sleeve resulted in a match for Hart but not Christian. 
R3861. 
 Because the analyst could not lay foundation for whose clothing she 
tested, the parties agreed to have a stipulation read into the record. R3867–
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69. The stipulation stated, “The sleeve tested which contained Jeremiah 
Hart’s DNA was from Jeremiah Hart’s jacket.” R3921. 
 The case manager later testified about the jacket. He identified the 
jacket Hart was wearing the night of the murder, and pictures of the jacket 
were shown to the jury. R4170–72; SE159–60. He confirmed that both sleeves 
on this jacket were tested and that Hart’s DNA was found on one sleeve but 
not the other. R4173. 
 Neither party referred to this evidence in closing argument. 
 During deliberations, the jury asked the court, “According to [the 
forensic DNA analyst’s report for the left sleeve of the jacket,] whose jacket 
sleeve was tested? Whose DNA was a match for left sleeve?” R1981. When 
the court proposed simply referring the jury to their memories of the 
stipulation, counsel urged the court to answer the question more directly. 
R4482–83. But after further discussion, counsel agreed with the court’s 
approach. R4483–84. The court responded to the jury by stating, “This issue 
was the subject of a stipulation read into the record by counsel. Please rely on 
your collective memory of the evidence presented.” R1981. 
 This Court should not address Hart’s appellate challenge because he 
has not adequately briefed it. Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
requires parties to “explain, with reasoned analysis … , why the party should 
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prevail on appeal.” Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(8). A claim is inadequately briefed 
when “the overall analysis is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and 
argument to the reviewing court.” State v. Nelson, 2015 UT 62, ¶39, 355 P.3d 
1031 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Hart’s claim is inadequately briefed because he has done nothing more 
than “baldly averred” that a mistrial would be appropriate and that counsel 
was ineffective for not requesting one. See Living Rivers v. Exec. Dir. of the Utah 
Dep’t of Envt’l Quality, 2017 UT 64, ¶43, 417 P.3d 57. But Hart has not 
attempted to meet his burden to prove that all competent counsel would have 
moved for a mistrial. In fact, he has not even looked to the standard for a 
mistrial that trial counsel would have had to meet to get one. Instead, he 
quotes the standard of review for the denial of a mistrial motion and the 
standard for determining whether a defendant may be retried after a mistrial 
is granted. Br.Aplt. 45. Nor has Hart shown prejudice by explaining why a 
mistrial motion was reasonably likely to have succeeded. This Court should 
therefore not consider this claim. 
 Hart’s ineffective assistance claim would fail on its merits in any event. 
Competent counsel could conclude that he had no valid basis to move for a 
mistrial. “[T]he trial court should not grant a mistrial except where the 
circumstances are such as to reasonably indicate that a fair trial cannot be had 
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and that a mistrial is necessary in order to avoid injustice.” Maestas, 2012 UT 
46, ¶325. Jury questions during deliberations are commonplace. In fact, the 
trial court made the offhand remark in this case that “the vast majority of my 
juries this past year have had questions.” R4485. The mere fact that a jury asks 
for clarification does not demonstrate that a fair trial cannot be had—
particularly in a six-day trial with 21 witnesses and 162 exhibits. Counsel 
could have concluded that any motion for a mistrial based on the jury asking 
for clarification would have been futile. 
 Competent counsel could have also decided that any confusion the jury 
faced related to a relatively unimportant piece of evidence. Unremarkably, 
Hart’s jacket had Hart’s DNA on it. Even if counsel could have used the 
absence of Christian’s DNA on Hart’s left sleeve to call into question 
Malcom’s and Burwell’s testimony that Hart put his left arm around 
Christian and held him to the seat, that fact was of little importance to the 
question of whether Hart shot Christian.  
 And again, along with counsel’s assessment of the weakness of a 
mistrial motion and the relative unimportance of the evidence, competent 
counsel would have weighed the costs of a mistrial in this case. Counsel could 
have reasonably concluded that the risk of facing the 404(b) evidence in a new 
trial was not justified by the jury’s apparent confusion about the DNA 
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evidence. Furthermore, counsel recognized that he had other reasonable 
alternatives to a mistrial. Counsel agreed to an instruction from the court that 
the jurors should refer to their collective memory of the evidence—a type of 
instruction that is commonplace in these situations.7 
 Finally, Hart would not be prejudiced by counsel forgoing a mistrial 
motion because the motion was not reasonably likely to have succeeded. As 
explained above, the jury question was commonplace and did not indicate 
that a fair trial could not be had. 
II. 
Counsel could reasonably conclude that he could use 
the case manager’s opinion testimony to undermine 
the State’s investigation, and that any objection to 
notice or admissibility would likely be futile. 
 Hart argues that counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the case 
manager’s opinion testimony about the blood found at the scene. Br.Aplt. 46–
48. He argues that the case manager’s testimony amounted to expert 
testimony, and that counsel could have objected for lack of notice that the 
                                              
7 Hart seems to suggest that a mistrial was appropriate because the 
parties’ initial stipulation about whose jacket was tested for DNA was 
“insufficient for the jury.” Br.Aplt. 45. Again, counsel does not explain how 
this required a mistrial to avoid injustice. Even if the stipulation was 
insufficient, the case manager later testified that the jacket that was tested for 
DNA was Hart’s jacket and that Hart’s DNA was found on one of the sleeves. 
R4170–73. 
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case manager would give expert testimony and because the State had not 
satisfied rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence. Br.Aplt. 46–47. He argues that the 
testimony was prejudicial because it had the “tendency to show that [Hart] 
lingered momentarily over the body of Christian McDonald and thus tie[d] 
him to the shooting death.” Br.Aplt. 47. 
 Hart has not shown deficient performance or prejudice. Regardless of 
whether counsel could have excluded the testimony through an objection, 
counsel reasonably chose to use the testimony to challenge the adequacy of 
the State’s investigation. Further, counsel could have reasonably decided that 
both a rule 702 objection and a notice objection were unlikely to keep out the 
case manager’s testimony. But in any event, the testimony was harmless. 
A. Background 
 The woman who found Christian saw him lying in the gutter on his 
back, with his head toward the west and his feet toward the east. R3516. 
Christian’s gun was partially under his left hip or leg, though the doctor who 
lived nearby picked it up with a towel and moved it onto the grass because it 
was getting in people’s way as they performed CPR. R3511–12, 3514, 3794. 
The extended magazine was near Christian’s left knee or calf, though one of 
the people assisting Christian may have kicked it because it lay farther to the 
east by the time officers photographed the scene. R3511–12, 3794–95; SE6. 
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 When officers arrived on the scene, they marked and photographed the 
evidence.8 Moving from east to west, the officers found skid marks that may 
have been from Burwell’s car, SE5 (Markers 34 and 36); the extended 
magazine, SE6 (Marker 35); Christian’s body several feet to the west, SE6, 26 
(Marker 20, location indicated by a yellow chalk mark in the photograph); 
several drops of blood near where Christian’s waist may have been, SE26 
(Stain A); Christian’s gun, also near his waist but on the grass, SE6 (Marker 
38); several drops and a smeared pool of blood underneath Christian’s body, 
SE26 (Stain B); several drops of blood just west of Christian’s head, SE26 
(Stain C); and a bloodstain trail that continued to move west for two blocks, 
R3738–39; see, e.g., SE26–65 (Stains D through Z, AA through AZ, and BA 
through BD). 
 Forensic DNA analysts tested blood from two bloodstains at the 
scene—Stain C, which was just west of Christian’s head, and Stain K, which 
was further west along the blood trail. R3856, 3874–75; SE5–6, 26, 36. Stains C 
and K both matched Hart’s DNA. R3856, 3874–75. Christian was specifically 
excluded as a contributor to Stain C. R3877–78.  
                                              
8 State’s Exhibit 5 and 6, which give an overview of the crime scene, are 
reproduced in Addendum D, along with several exhibits showing the 
bloodstain evidence. 
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 A forensic scientist with experience in bloodstain pattern analysis 
testified that Stain A—the one near Christian’s waist and the first stain 
moving east to west—was a “passive stain,” meaning the drops of blood “are 
acted upon only by gravity.” R3724; SE27. In other words, the source of the 
blood was stationary. The expert reached the same conclusion for some of the 
blood in Stain B—the blood under where Christian had lain—but another 
portion of the blood in Stain B was from blood pooling on the ground. R3727; 
SE38. Some of the blood in Stain C was also from a stationary source, but 
some indicated that the source was “mostly stationary” but had “slight lateral 
movement.” R3727–28; SE29. Stains D through G also showed “slight 
movement” at most. R3729–32, 3738. But Stains H through BD all represented 
that the source of the blood was traveling with “a lot more … horizontal 
movement” toward the west. R3738–39. The expert stated on cross-
examination that her bloodstain analysis did not reveal whether each 
bloodstain came from the same source; she would need DNA evidence. 
R3740. 
 As the final witness for the State, the case manager presented the 
opinions he drew from the evidence as the detective assigned to the case. 
R4160. He repeated the forensic DNA analyst’s conclusion that Stain C—the 
stain just west of Christian’s head—was Hart’s blood, and he repeated the 
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bloodstain expert’s opinion that the source of Stain C “would have had to 
have been stationary for a period of time to leave that pattern.” R4167–68. The 
case manager then stated that Stain B exhibited “a different pattern” from 
Stain C. R4168; SE28–30. And he offered his opinion “as the case manager” 
that Stain B was Christian’s blood. R4168. He explained that he reached that 
opinion because Stain B was under the area where Christian was lying, and 
Christian’s clothing had blood on the side that was against the ground. 
R4168–69. 
 The case manager also offered his opinion that Hart was the source of 
all the blood at the scene except Stain B. R4169 He explained his opinion by 
stating that the patterns of the individual stains, other than Stain B, were 
consistent with each other. R4169. He also based his opinion on the medical 
examiner’s testimony that due to the nature of Christian’s wound, most of 
Christian’s blood would pool in his chest cavity and only some would have 
come out as he was on the ground. R3826–27, 4169, 4142.  
 On cross-examination, counsel questioned the case manager about his 
conclusion that Stain A—the easternmost stain, by Christian’s hip—was 
Hart’s blood and that Stain B was Christian’s blood. R4240–43. Counsel got 
the case manager to concede that this was “[a]bsolutely” a “pretty big 
assumption” without having Stains A and B tested for DNA. R4240–41. The 
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case manager reiterated the bases of his opinion. R4241–42. But he conceded 
that he “[a]bsolutely” “could have foreclosed any speculation on the matter 
by simply having stain A tested for DNA,” and that Stain C—the stain just 
west of Christian’s head—was the “eastern-most stain that you can 
definitively attribute to Jeremiah Hart.” R4241–42. Later in the cross-
examination, counsel asked whether the case manager had any “definitive 
evidence” “other than your supposition about the pattern” that Stain A came 
from Hart, and the case manager conceded that he had “no forensic report 
stating that.” R4250.  
 After the prosecutor had the case manager reiterate his opinion and 
add that the extended magazine was also found east of Christian’s body, 
R4271–73, trial counsel returned to the issue on recross. The case manager 
conceded that he did not know how long the source of Stains A and C were 
stationary and said they could have been stationary for just one or two 
seconds. R4277. He conceded that he “had plenty of time” to get Stain A 
tested. R4277. After reiterating his opinion about Stain A, he also conceded 
that “[n]othing definitively” established that Hart was ever east of Stain C. 
R4278–79. 
 Hart called his own forensic scientist to testify. He testified that Stains 
A and C were “slightly different” in pattern. R4339–40. When asked his 
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opinion on the source of Stain A, the expert said, “I don’t make assumptions 
if I don’t have a result. This—Blood Stain A was not tested. So I would make 
no comment. I would make no conclusion as to whose blood that is.” R4340. 
He added that the State could have tested but chose not to, “So we don’t know 
whose blood it is.” R4341. He said there was no evidence “positively 
matched” to Hart east of Stain C, and that if Hart had touched the extended 
magazine, the expert would have expected to find his DNA on it. R4341–42. 
“We are really good at finding DNA, very, very trace amounts of DNA.” 
R4342. 
 The expert acknowledged on cross-examination that investigators 
typically do not test every bloodstain for DNA. R4354. But he stated that he 
would test “the most important ones, which are the ones closest to … the 
actual body,” and if there is a trail, “[t]he rule is” that you test the first, 
second, and third drops, then random selections after that. R4354. He 
reiterated on redirect examination that in this case, Stain A would have been 
the most important one to test. R4368–69. 
 In closing argument, the prosecutor referred to Hart’s last statement to 
police, where he said he got out of the car and ran. R4429. The prosecutor 
argued, “We know that is not true because of the blood stain. … He was 
standing there.” R4429. Later, the prosecutor conceded that investigators 
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“should have got DNA” from Stain A. R4434. While he insisted that it was 
Hart’s blood, he argued that it did not really matter whose blood it was in 
Stain A because it was all within a couple feet of each other. R4434–35. 
 Trial counsel began his closing argument by emphasizing “hole[s] in 
the evidence”—“missing guns, missing weed.” R4442. Later, he argued that 
the positioning of the evidence at the scene did not line up with the State’s 
theory of the case. R4452. Counsel tried to distance Hart from the extended 
magazine, which was photographed several feet east of where Christian had 
been. Counsel asserted that Stain C—which was just west of Christian’s 
head—“is the easternmost position that we can definitively say … Hart ever 
went,” and that “corresponds with the back door of the car where Jeremiah 
Hart was sitting.” R4452. He argued that it was “irresponsible” of the State 
never to test Stains A and B, and that it was “a pretty huge logical leap” to 
conclude that Stain A came from the same source as Stain C merely because 
they look alike. R4452–53.  
 Counsel then tied the argument together by discussing the extended 
magazine, which was further east than any of the bloodstains: “the reason 
that they want Jeremiah Hart further this way is because they can’t explain 
how that magazine ends—I don’t know, ends up 15 feet the other way, 10, at 
least 10 … .” R4453. Counsel highlighted evidence from the trial indicating 
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that when the clip was released from the gun, it would have fallen to the 
ground and would not “shoot” out, so it would not have come from Hart, 
who fled west after getting out of the car. R4454. Counsel acknowledged that 
according to the bloodstain expert, Hart stopped momentarily outside the car 
to “kind of take stock of the situation” before fleeing west. R4454. “But [the 
evidence] also shows he never goes [east].” R4454. 
B. Counsel reasonably chose to use the case manager’s testimony 
to challenge the State’s investigation rather than making 
objections that were likely to fail and were not likely to affect 
the outcome of the case. 
 Counsel reasonably decided to let the case manager testify about the 
source of Stain A without objection then turn that testimony to undermine 
the witness, the State’s investigation, and the State’s theory of the case. 
Counsel got the case manager to concede that his assessment of the source of 
the easternmost stain (Stain A) was a “pretty big assumption,” that it was not 
backed by any forensic evidence, that the only way to definitively identify 
the source was through DNA testing, and that he could have submitted it for 
testing. R4240–42, 4250, 4277–79. Counsel also used the defense expert to 
undermine the case manager’s opinion. The defense expert testified that Stain 
A would have been the “most important” one to test and there is no way of 
knowing its source without testing. R4341–42, 4354, 4368–69. Counsel then 
drew on this evidence in closing argument to simultaneously attack the 
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State’s case and to provide an evidentiary basis for separating Hart from the 
magazine. R4453–54. Even if counsel could have successfully excluded the 
case manager’s testimony, it was reasonable to use it to Hart’s advantage 
instead. See Bedell, 2014 UT 1, ¶¶21–25. 
 In any event, counsel could have reasonably concluded that any 
objection would have failed, and Hart has not shown that no competent 
attorney would think otherwise. See Premo, 562 U.S. at 124 (stating that “the 
relevant question under Strickland” is whether “no competent attorney would 
think a motion … would have failed”). The record does not establish that the 
case manager—a detective with six years’ experience as a homicide detective 
and 20 years’ experience in law enforcement—was unqualified to offer the 
opinions he offered. R4007. Nor does the record show that the case manager’s 
opinions were unreliable under rule 702. And Hart has not moved for a rule 
23B remand to create a record to establish those facts. While the State would 
have borne the burden of making the threshold showing under rule 702 at 
trial, Hart bears the burden of proving ineffective assistance. To do so, he 
must overcome the presumption that counsel reasonably did not object. See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. And he must point to evidence to overcome that 
presumption. Burt, 571 U.S. at 23.  
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 Counsel may well have chosen not to object under rule 702 because he 
knew that if he did, the State would be able to lay foundation in front of the 
jury that would not only satisfy 702, but would also strengthen the case 
manager’s opinion in the eyes of the jury. Cf. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 
(“Unlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant 
proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with the 
client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge.”). Thus, even the chance 
that an objection might have failed would have been enough for a reasonable 
attorney not to risk that outcome, particularly where counsel could 
effectively use the case manager’s testimony against the State. 
 Hart has also failed to show that all competent counsel would have 
objected under the expert-notice statute. The expert-notice statute generally 
requires 30 days’ notice before trial that a party intends to offer expert 
testimony. Utah Code §77-17-13(1)(a). But there are two exceptions that 
counsel could have decided would excuse the State from that requirement. 
First, the expert-notice statute “does not apply to the use of an expert who is 
an employee of the state or its political subdivisions, so long as the opposing 
party is on reasonable notice through general discovery that the expert may 
be called as a witness at trial, and the witness is made available to 
cooperatively consult with the opposing party upon reasonable notice.” Id. 
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§77-17-13(6). The case manager was a detective with the Salt Lake City Police 
Department, a political subdivision of the state. The State gave notice through 
its general witness list that the case manager would testify (though it also 
provided an additional notice of expert witness that the case manager would 
testify about “drug distribution practices and methodology”). R338, 735.  
 But even if the state employee exception were not adequate, counsel 
could have concluded that the other exception was. Testimony of an expert 
at a preliminary hearing “constitutes notice of the expert, the expert’s 
qualifications, and a report of the expert’s proposed trial testimony as to the 
subject matter testified to by the expert at the preliminary hearing.” Utah 
Code §77-17-13(5)(a). The case manager testified at the preliminary hearing 
that “we” analyzed the bloodstain pattern to determine a direction of travel 
and determined that the source of the blood was traveling west. R2415. He 
testified about blood spatter shown in specific exhibits and explained how 
the “spines and satellites” in the blood indicated that the trail was moving 
west. R2420–21. And he testified that swabs were taken, submitted for DNA 
testing, and determined to be Hart’s blood. R2415–16. Counsel thus could 
have reasonably decided that any objection based on the expert-notice statute 
would have failed.  
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 But even if an objection were well founded, the most counsel could 
have obtained was a continuance. Utah Code §77-17-13(4)(b). The expert-
notice statute allows for excluding expert testimony only on a showing of a 
deliberate, bad-faith violation. Utah Code §77-17-13(4)(b); State v. Roberts, 
2018 UT App 9, ¶¶38–39, 414 P.3d 962. But see State v. Peraza, 2018 UT App 
68, ¶37, 427 P.3d 276 (ruling that trial court erred in admitting expert 
testimony when State violated expert notice statute, but not discussing bad 
faith), cert. granted, 429 P.3d 460 (Utah 2018).  
 Counsel could have reasonably decided not to seek a continuance. The 
record demonstrates that counsel was prepared to meet the case manager’s 
testimony, so a continuance was unnecessary. It also would have been 
reasonable for counsel to decide that moving for even a brief continuance 
during the State’s final witness, on day four of trial, so that counsel would 
have extra time that he did not need to prepare to cross-examine a witness, 
could antagonize the jury by prolonging their service.  
C. Hart has not shown a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result had he objected.  
 Hart argues that he was prejudiced because the case manager’s 
testimony tended to show that Hart “lingered over the body of Christian 
McDonald,” and that the lingering somehow “tie[d] him to the shooting.” 
Br.Aplt. 47.  
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 Hart’s claim is inadequately briefed because he does not explain how 
lingering over the body tied him to the shooting. Nor does he examine the 
case manager’s testimony in the context of the entire evidentiary picture. See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695–96 (requiring consideration of the totality of the 
evidence). Because Hart has inadequately briefed an essential element of his 
ineffective assistance claim, this Court should not address the claim. See Utah 
R. App. P. 24(a)(8); Nelson, 2015 UT 62, ¶39. 
 In any event, the entire evidentiary picture demonstrates that whether 
Hart lingered at the scene was irrelevant. Counsel got the case manager to 
acknowledge that Hart only needed to remain for a second or two for the 
bloodstains to appear like they came from a stationary source. R4277. Thus, 
counsel conceded in closing argument that the evidence established that Hart 
stayed there long enough to take stock of his surroundings before fleeing 
west. R4454.  
 The relevant question, according to trial counsel, was not whether Hart 
lingered, but how far east he went. Counsel’s reasonable strategy was to 
separate Hart from the extended magazine—one of the most damning pieces 
of evidence for Hart. 
 But despite counsel’s best efforts, the evidence connecting Hart to the 
shooting was strong. Carter gave Hart a gun with an extended magazine into 
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which Carter had put a variety of bullets. R3934–35. Burwell and Malcom 
both saw Hart shoot Christian, and they both said he did it with a gun that 
had an extended magazine. R3353, 3358–62, 4086–88. Hart returned the gun 
to Carter without the extended magazine. R3939. An extended magazine 
from a 9 mm Glock was later found at the scene, as was a spent 9 mm casing 
with markings consistent with those made by a Glock. R3685–86, 3691, 3922–
23; SE10–11, 24–25, 122. The types of bullets in the magazine were consistent 
with the types of bullets Carter said were in the gun. R3685–87, 3935; SE10–
12. And even though officers found the magazine several feet further east 
from where Hart may have gotten out of the car, the very first people on the 
scene said the magazine was right by Christian’s knee or calf when they first 
got there. R3511–12, 3794–95; SE6. Furthermore, the medical examiner 
explained that Christian was shot with the muzzle of the gun placed against 
his chest—a positioning consistent with Burwell’s and Malcom’s accounts, 
but unlikely to have occurred with Hart’s account that Christian was shot (in 
the front seat) as Hart and Malcom wrestled over the gun (in the back seat). 
R3355–57, 3360–62, 3815–16, 3820–21, 4087–88; SE82–86.  
 Finally, as the prosecutor pointed out, given the relatively close 
proximity of Stains A and C, it does not really matter whether Stain A was 
from Hart or Christian. There is no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
-61- 
result had the case manager’s testimony about Stain A been excluded entirely 
rather than thoroughly discredited on cross-examination. And again, 
excluding it entirely would have excluded evidence that could have 
jaundiced the jury’s view of the State’s investigation, resulting in making the 
State’s case stronger, not weaker. 
III. 
Hart’s cumulative prejudice claim fails because 
counsel was not deficient in any way. 
 Finally, Hart argues that this Court should reverse under the 
cumulative error doctrine. Br.Aplt. 48. Under that doctrine, courts will 
reverse when “‘the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines [the 
court’s] confidence ... that a fair trial was had.’” Martinez-Castellanos, 2018 UT 
46, ¶39. “[A] court must make three determinations before reversing a verdict 
or sentence under the cumulative error doctrine: it must determine that (1) 
an error occurred, (2) the error, standing alone, has a conceivable potential 
for harm, and (3) the cumulative effect of all the potentially harmful errors 
undermines its confidence in the outcome.” Id. ¶42. Because counsel was not 
deficient in any way, this claim fails. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm. 
-62- 
 Respectfully submitted on May 23, 2019. 
  SEAN D. REYES 
  Utah Attorney General 
 
/s/ William M. Hains 
  WILLIAM M. HAINS 
  Assistant Solicitor General 




CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
 I certify that in compliance with rule 24(g), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, this brief contains 13,943 words, excluding the table of contents, 
table of authorities, addenda, and certificate of counsel. I also certify that in 
compliance with rule 21(g), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this brief, 
including the addenda: 
  does not contain private, controlled, protected, safeguarded, sealed, 
juvenile court legal, juvenile court social, or any other information to which 
the right of public access is restricted by statute, rule, order, or case law (non-
public information). 
 ☐ contains non-public information and is marked accordingly, and 
that a public copy of the brief has been filed with all non-public information 
removed.   
 
/s/ William M. Hains 
  WILLIAM M. HAINS 
  Assistant Solicitor General 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 I certify that on May 23, 2019, the Brief of Appellee was served upon 
appellant’s counsel of record by ☐ mail  email ☐ hand-delivery at:  
Herschel Bullen 
369 East 900 South, No. 302 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
 
 
 I further certify that an electronic copy of the brief in searchable 
portable document format (pdf): 
  was filed with the Court and served on appellant by email, and the 
appropriate number of hard copies have been or will be mailed or hand-
delivered upon the Court and counsel within 7 days. 
 ☐ was filed with the Court on a CD or by email and served on appellant. 
 ☐ will be filed with the Court on a CD or by email and served on 
appellant within 14 days. 
 
 




Utah Code Section 77-L7'13
Expert testimony generally- Notice requirements
(f) (u) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify in a
felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing held
pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing parry as soon as
practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or 10 days before the hearing.
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's
curriculum vitae, and one of the following:
(i) a copy of the expert's report, if one exists; or
(ii) a written explanation of the expert's proposed testimony sufficient to
give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony;
and
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to cooperatively consult with the
opposing pat$ on reasonable notice'
(c) The patry intending to call the expert is responsible for any fee charged by
the expert for the consultation.
(2) Ifan expert's anticipated testimony will be based in whole or part on the
results of any tests or other specialize d data, the party intending to call the
witness shall provide to the opposing pafty the information upon request'
(3) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report or the information
concerning the expert's proposed testimony, the party receiving notice shall
provide to tne otkrer parry notice of witnesses whom the party anticipates calling
io rebut the exper/s testimony, including the information required under
Subsection (t)(b).
(a) (u) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply with the
requirements of this sectiory the opposing parry shall, if necessary to prevent
substantial prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of the trial or hearing
sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony.
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the result of
bad faith on the part of any party or attorne/, the court shall impose
appropriate sanctions. The remedy of exclusion of the expert's testimony will
only apply if the court finds that a par!v deliberately violated the provisions
of this section.
(S) (u) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a preliminary
hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
constitutes notice of the exper! the expert's qualifications, and a report of the
expert's proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to by the
expert at the preliminary hearing.
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the preliminary hearing
shall provide the opposing party with a copy of the expert's curriculum vitae
as soon as practicable prior to trial or any hearing at which the expert may be
called as an exPert witness.
(6) This section does not apply to the use of an expert who is an employee of the
,tut" or its political subdivisions, so long as the opposing party is on reasonable
notice through general discovery that the expert may be called as a witness at
tria1, and the witness is made available to cooperatively consult with the
opposing parry upon reasonable notice'
Rule 702,Utah Rules of Evidence
Testimony by Experts
(a) Subject to the limitations in paragraph (b), u witness who is qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, trainin1r or education may testify in the
form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert's scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue.
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for
expert testimony only if there is a threshold showing that the principles or
methods that are underlying in the testimony
(1) are reliable,
(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and
(3) have been reliably applied to the facts.
(c) The threshold showing required by paragraph (b) is satisfied if the underlying
principles or method.s, iricluding the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner
Lf tf,uir application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by the relevant
expert community.
Addendum B


























was there linaudible] time, other t.han that, tell somebody that.
I killed him linaudible] . I never agreed t'o that part of it''
MR. EVERSHED: Okay. I have nothing further'
THE COURT: Cross-examination?
MR. 'IOIINSON: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor'




serving is 5 to life or
A. linaudible] to l-5.
o. Five to life on aggravated burglary; is that right?
A.Aggravatedburglary,possessionofafirearmbya
restricted person and death by receiving stolen property.
a. Don't you also have a federaf conviction?
A. Yeah, from L997.
A.Allright.Andyouserved,what,aboutllyearson
that?
A. l-0 I/2, and then a year violation'
O. That was armed robberY?
A. Bank robberY.
a.Yeah.Allright.Anddoyouhaveaparoledateon
your on Your currenL term?
A. No, exPiration date of 2:-.1-7 '
O. 2LL7, so25


























a. Not in Your life time?
A. DefinitelY not.
A. AI1 right. Do you have a date to see the board?
A. Next Year.
o. Next year. Do you have any information about how Lhe
board treats parole requests from prisoners serving for crimes
like yours with a record like Yours?
A. My mat.rix right now is 10 t/2 years.
a. Your matrix does?
A. It's l-0 t/2 years from the matrix'
o. okay. And you haven,t just been grant.ed immunity in
exchange for your testimony today, have you?
A. Iinaudible] .
a. The statets the state's promised to give you some
other helP, haven't theY?
A. They're sitting right over there to the board'
o.Andt'hey,veactua}lyprovidedyouadraft,haven't
they?
A. I've seen a draft letter. I haven'L been provided
Iinaudibte] .
O. Did You ask them for
A. No, I didn't ask them
the letter or did theY offer it?
O. OkaY. You have you
for anything.
have read the draft letter,
t.hough?25

























A. Yeah, I have.
O. And if -- and if you come in and do what they've
asked Lo you do, they're going to send t.his off to the board?
A. Yeah.
O. Okay. And it ' s a pretty glowJ-ng l-etter, isn'L it?
Says some pretty nice things about you, doesn't it?
A. Yeah.
O. And let me let me ask you: First page, IasL
paragraph of the let.ter, "Mf. Hart thought it besL to pin the
murder on a dying man who probably did not have much time to
Iive anyway.
secondly, MI.. Carter was on probat.ion for aggravated
burglary, a first degree felony and he had violated his
probation so a warrant was out. Mr. carter was going to prison
anyway for a while so Mr. Hart thought to callously pin a
murder on his cousin.'t
Is that what the letter states?
A. Yes.
O. Is that accurate?
A. We agreed to it.
o. you -- but. you went to him and you said, ",Jeremiah"
A.linaudible]word.forwordwhathistellhimlwas
dying linaudible] I told him so he could use my name to buy you
sometime. I never said for him to say that I shot anybody'25

























O. okay. But you were never you were never charged
for shooting anybody, they figured that out a long time ago,
right, thaL you didn't have anything to do with it?
A. Yeah.
o. But you he said. "use my name,rr that would mean yourre
saying, "It's okay for you to put. me there at that scene and
I'11 go into the cops and I will lie about what I had to do
with it. " Is that right? You said you would help him out in
t.hat way?
A. Yeah linaudible] say that I shot anybody'
O.Okay.Sobut--butyourposition,thesecondthe
second that the jig was up that you weren'L the one who was
there in the car, your position remained the same?
A. Iinaudible] Yeah, after.




suit by saying pulled Lhe trigger or whether you got into the
suit by walking in there and saying you pulled the trigger,
same situation?
A. Yeah. I didn't really do linaudible] that was his
arrested that night at that time when they
yeah, I said I told them I did it just to get
Iinaudible] got
questioned me,
j-t over with, they can stoP bothering me.25

























o. But your motivation for testifying today isn't that
2 L/2 years ago Jeremiah Hart went a little above and beyond
the agreement that you two had together
out with this case, right?
about you helPing him
A. linaudible] expound on thal. so I can understand.
o. your motivation -- and I believe in your interview




you've been done wrong by Mr. Hart is he didn't give you all of
t.he information back then, wdY back in January 20]-5, and that's
t.he reason that you don't feel any allegiance to him and yourre
going Lo come in and say whatever they want you to say about
them?
A.They'renottellingmetosayanyt'hing'rrmjust
saying what's whaL's [inaudible] . They're not telling me to
do anything.
o.okay.Sot.heycameinwhendidtheyofferyouthe
letter to the board?
A. MaYbe the same daY, I don't know'
O. Back two weeks ago? SePtember?
A. linaudible] I don'L know' I don't remember
Iinaudible] around that time, Yeah.
come with t.he draft and hand it to you andO. Did theY25
























say/ rrHey/ by the waY,
A. Iinaudible]
weeks ago. This was a
we can help you out this way as weII"?
It wasn'L two
O. A lit.t1e longer?
A. yeah, maybe a month, month and a half beforehand.
Because I was in a different part of the prison at that time '
O. okay. Who came down and provided you with this
letter, this draft letter?
A. Mr. Evershed and the detective, my attorney. Because
at first they tried to come talk to me linaudible] I want my
attorney present. I didn,t know linaudible] attorney at first,
he told me he was. Because I didn't remember him from the
first time I came up here and pled the fifth'
a.Allright.Nowpartofthatletterhassaid--and
this is on the second page, third paragraph, rrMr. Carter has
shown grit and true character in this murder case' Words mean
somelhing but. actions say it all. "
Doyoufeellikeyou'Veshowntruegritandtrue
character throughout this?
A. [inaud.ible] sometimes I forget things, but I'm here.
O. okay.
A. Because I d.idn't want to be here in t.he first place.
a.Accordingtoyou,youseLouttodeliberatelyto
impede a murder investigation on behalf of your cousin?
A. Yeah.
Iet me rephrase that, no
Iittle longer than that
25


























A. Is that. does that show characLer and griLr
my cousin either.Iinaudible]
You say that does or does not show character and
A. No, it don't.
a. okay. You said you gave Mr. Hart what. you believed
to be t.he murder weaPon?
A. I d.on't know if it's the murder weapon or not'
O. okaY.
A. I don't know if it is or not. I gave him my firearm.
r got my firearm back linaudible] .
A.Okay.Yougavehimafirearm,yougotitback'and
Lhen you got rid of it. Why did you get rid of it?
A. linaudible] .
o. so you couldn't have gone on Amazon.com and ordered
another cliP?
A. Me going on Arnazon and do whatever, but I'm like,
,,Nah, f ,lr -- Irm a felon." I'm just going to linaudible].
like I said before, I was at a bad place in my time and
Iinaudible] sit around waiting Iinaudible] pull over
linaudible] still had plans linaudible] something to myself
Iinaudible] sit around and wait '
a.Youhadplansofdoingsomethingtoyourself?
A. To mYself linaudible].






























go buy a new magazine for this gun, you'd thrown the
and wait until You find one
A. Yeah.
t.hat comes along that has
gun away
a clip?
okay. How did You get rid of that
that gun?
somebody and they got rid of it for me '
O. That




o And that's your friend up at Kennecott?
A. YuP.
a. And did you ever identify that person to the police?
A. I lied about his name.
A. You Iied about his name'
A. Yes, I did.
O. Okay. Have you told' them that before today?
a.'Theyknowthat.Theyaskedmehisname,Itoldthem
I wouldn't tell them thaL.
O. OkaY. WhY whY won't You?
A. Because I'm not.
o. okay. so this is all of the conduct that you believe
does show true grit and character?
A.linaudible].Aninnocentlifewastakenandsol
mean, yeah, I'rl here linaudible] '
A. But don'L You
A. linaudible] .
A. don't You think iL?






























A. Iet me answer/
d.ragging another individual
please. But it means it is
down that did not what the use
of the firearm was for and whY. I honestly -- I believe in mY
thing to do to [inaudible] a
Iinaudible] .
heart that it wasn't the right
person involved in this when he
O. okaY.
A. Iinaudible] .
o. so your friend doesn'L know anything about it, but
it -- but iL would help the investigaLion, right? we could
have actually confirmed that what you're saying is true?
A. Yeah
o. Because when you initially spoke to Lhe police, YoU
told them t.hat there was nothing in your back seat when
,feremiah got ouL of t.hat car and took him to the hospital-,
correct?
I honestly remember
WelI, you lied about
that. linaudiblel don't remember.
aII kinds of t.hings to the
Yeah, I lied.
at the outset, right?
Iinaudible] .
On every material aspect of their investigation,



































O. Okay. And and then they come around with this
glowing letter to the board of pardons and parole and you
change j-t to now you have character and grite






You can ask Mr. Evershed that why he wrote that,
might
f ar as t.hat goes, I didn't write that.
. It's going to helP though, right?
. To be honest with you, it may, but not my current
Does it. mat.t.er I was in a place where I wasn't supposed
And t.hey may give me more time than I've got so iL
not help at a1I.
a.HaVeyouyouhaven'tbeenchargedforanyconduct
in relation to t.his case, right?
A. No. Not at this time, Do'
o.okay.HaSanyonefromtheSt'ateexpressedtoyou
whether they will or won't charge you?
A. No.
O. Okay. So nobody said, I'H€1r, if you help us out'

































A. It's less but there is other }aw enforcement
Iinaudibfe] stitl charge me.
A. okaY.
A. linaudible] wanL to.
a. A11 right. So you gave an interview .June 3, 2015, so
t.his is a few months after after you walked in there the
first time and said, rrHey, yeah, I wenL over and shot this
9uy," and then they said, "No, you didn't' We know you
didn,t.il Then you said, "A1I right. I didn'L do it. Jeremiah
puL me up to -- me and,feremiah came up with this scheme to
fool_ you guys, " right.? That's how the first interview went,
right?
A. Yeah.
o. And then you have another interview in June , 20L5 '
and this is supposed to be your coming clean intervi-ew, right?
A. Yeah.




'rI don't. know if I r don't know if he shot him
never told me if he shot anybody. He didn't tell-
will even take a polygraph on that' If need be, I




A. You can saY that, Yeah, I guess'25









O. Okay. So then you have anoLher conversation on
September l-3th, 2 1,/2 years later after the incident and did
you just come with a litt.le more cfean to say, "He did tell
me that he shot that guy"?
A. linaudible] both times I was still I was st.ill
trying to protect him. We were out here in a situation where
I'm going to prison [inaudible] same room linaudible] . See,
yeah, if I sat t.here and I made up whatever to have to protect
myself. so, yeah, at that time they had me in a cell with a
person who was Laking care of me.
MR. ,fOHNSON: Your Honor hold on a second'
THE WITNESS: HUh?
MR. iIOHNSON: Your Honor' can we have a sidebar?
THE COTIRT: YCS .
(Bench Conference. )
MR. ,JOHNSON: I think PerhaPs
MR. EVERSHED: He didn't identify him'
MR. iIOHNSON: lInaudible] I think we need to
MR. EVERSHED: If I think if we draw anymore




(End of Bench Conference.)










































last question. Itm going to focus on your June 3, 20L5
i_nterview. A1I right. Now in that June 20L5 interview
right. ,June 20L5. Do you recaI] and do you recall





A. Vince Meister. Do You
,Jeremiah Hart said nothing about
and he said nothing abouL it?
A. Yeah.
recall telling them that
a gun, that. you asked about it
O. By September, not only did he talk to you about
9urr, he asked you for a gun, you gave him a gun, he took a




you went and got rid of the gun?
A. Once I saw they were charging him with five to life,
when he was walking out the door, I linaudible] . So I did tell
t.he truth.
a.Allright.Stop.Stopforaminuterightthere.
Who told you that you're going to be charged with another five
to Iife? Vince Meister?




o. And that influenced" what you were going say from then25



























A. If I was going to come forward and tel-I my side,
yeah.
o. A11 right. You were looking at a five to life for
obstrucLion, first degree felonY?
A. Yeah.
o. Did you ever did you ever determine whether there
is such a thing as first degree felony obstruction of justice?
A. No, Irve heard that you could -- it could be
enhanced, so Iinaudible] it can be enhanced'
a. Okay. How did you ever hear how it can be
A. I just asked. I just asked-
O. enhanced? AI1 right.
A. No, I didn't.
A. So how would you feel if if you knew that




A. Found out about that along later down the road I
found out about that.
a.okay.InthatJune2oL5interview,doyourecall
saying that you donrt know where the gun is?
A. Yeah.
o. Do you recall saying that the gun was melted down?
































o. At one point you said he did it, at another point you
said you did, does that sound about right?
A.No.No.Ia]-readyadmittedthat'Igotridofit.
o. whose idea was it. whose idea was it for you to get
drawn in to whaLever the heck happened there in sugarhouse?
A. Like I said before, I brought it up'
O. That was
,Jeremiah Hart and
you. That was You.












case against ITI€, " right?
shot and you said, 'rwell,
A. He didn't. say nothing about. they're building no case,
not.hing like that, flo. I said it was self -defense. said
linaudible] happens to be the case, iL would be self-defense






























A. Yeah, because I believed it to be so'
o. AIl right. so and without getting into details, I
think you told me that that Mr. Hart has taken care of you
through a lot of medical conditions; is that correct?
A. Yeah.
a. And and did he he let you live with him before
all this haPPened?
A. Yeah. As soon as they're violate t.hey violated
his parole.
a.Allright'.Youguysbeforealloft'hishappened,











he helped take care of you, and for how
your life did Jeremiah Hart help take care
Do you think it's a a few times take care of a few
when I was a kid and then just recentlY. And then
my 1ife, so it's been offIrve been locked uP the majoritY of
and on PrettY much here and there'
MR. iIOHNSON: YOUT HONOT,
recess to consu]t
THE COURT: Can You aPProach?
MR. .fOHNSON: Yes.
(Bench Conference. )
|d like to take a brief
25


























cl-ient about what. wetre going to do, whether I'm going to take
it. one direction or noL.
THE COIIRT: I think I t.hink when we I re in the
MR. EVERSIIED: I





don't t.hink my redirect is going to
finish with him?
wanl to I need to talk to mY
a
an exam, we need to finish the exam'
(End of Bench Conference. )
MR. 'JOHNSON: Thank You, Your Honor'
(BY ldR. iIOHNSON: ) So it would be fair to say that









o and taken care of You at times when
particularly when you've been in ill
Yeah.
o.okay.Now,youtestifiedthatyourmotivation
you,ve kind of testified to three different motivations now'
one, that you didn't. he wasn' L st.raight with you at the
outset, right? That was one motivation for changing the story
A. That's not whY I'm here'
a.okay.AnothermotivationwasVinceMeistertoldyou
you're looking at five to life unless you come clean?
A.Ineversaidthatwasthereasonwhy,nolonetime.



























I think you actually just testified
No, I said that Vince Meister told me I would get
charged with a five to life
O. Yeah.
first p1ace.
A. OkaY. But You said at
you changed Your mind and started
right? A storY that corroborated
A. It has no nothing to
O. OkaY. But. it had you
five
Didn't saY that.
to life and once I
five to life, I started
Yeah.
A. Other than that, that's not why I was here in the
that point in ,June that's whY
tetling a different story,
do with vince, Period.
said I was looking for a
A.





O. Okay. Itm just going to ask you one more time' Y€s
or no, do you think that yourve conducted yourself with Lrue
grit. and character throughout this murder case?
A. Honestly, because my memory is a little bad'
Iinaudible] someLimes, Yeah'
O. OkaY' Yes and no then?
A. Yeah.
a. Fair enough.
MR. iIOHNSON: That's all- I have'




























TIIE COURT: MT . EVCTShCd.
MR. EVERSHED: Your Honor, a 1oL of has been made
about a I L/2-page letter to the board. A couple I'hings have
been read. f would just ask under the doctrine of completeness
that it just be entered in as an exhibit '
MR. iIOHNSON: Maybe put it in as Defense 2 or
MS. VISSER: 3.
MR. iIoHNSON: Def ense 3. we can put it in as Def ense
3.
THE COURT: Any objection to the Defense 3?
MR. EVERSHED: No, Your Honor
THE COURT: Defense 3 is admit.t.ed.
was received into evidence.)(Defense Exhibit 3
A. (BY MR. EVERSHED:)
part. Character and grit.
"words mean something but actions say it all'" okay'




Kary, to testify here with your cousin? Is this easy for
A. NO.
okay.
IT'S rro, it's not. I thought I was [inaudible]
I will follow-uP with that last
Okay. SpecificalIY what it saYS,
a
A


























O. For you to be here and tell us what yourve
experienced through this whole thing, through this homicide,
werre t.alking about a dead person here, and and to tell us




O. Like, right now.
A. ,fust Period?
o. Like emot'ionally, what is this tike for you to be
here?
A. I know I know I ain't want to be here but" '
a. okaY.
A. It,s hard for me to be here. There is consequences
for everything.
O. Okay. Your first interview and this is this is
mentioned in t.his letter. You had an interview Februaty L9'
20:-5, the police, you originally gave them a lie' At that same
interview did you begin to tell them the truth?
A. Yeah.
o. okay. so in the words on cross-examination you were
impeding a murder, buL you were impeding a murder only during
that. interview where you later learned the t.ruth?
A. Yeah.

























a. when you say -- I want to understand this in terms
of I want to get to your state of mind. When you say
January 20i-5, February 2015 you were just ready to do something
t.o yourself . What do you mean by that?
A. I was willing just to take my own life or have the
police shoot me.
a. Is that whY You had a gun?
A. yeah. Part of the time, yeah, and protect myself.
A. Why were you just willing to shoot yourself?
A. ,Just get tired.
O. okay.
A. Get tired after a while. I mean, I get tired
linaudible] just get tired of everything at times. And that's
jusL sometimes the way I tend to deal with stuff.
A. And you said you had some experience with
self-defense in your own case, bul you don't have a legal
degree, correcL?
A. No, I do not.
a. AII right. And then finally it was mentioned on this
,fanuary 3, 2075, inLerview with that you there was no
mention of a gun, but. in fact, there was menLion of a gun,
right? Didn'L you tell the investigators in that interview
that .Teremiah pulled a gun ouL on the guy in the car? Do you
remember saying that? saying that in the June of 201,5
interview?25

























As a matter of fact obviously, thatrs more than
two years ago.
Yeah,
IL's hard to remember; is that. right?
A I hardly remember t.hat.
it true that Vince Meister asked you, rrsoO. So j-sn't
Jeremiah says he pulled out a gun.rr Your response
MR. EVERSHED: Sorry, counsel, it's page L7,
O. (aY un. EVERSHED:) Your response is: Unintelligible
on Lhe guy in the back seat and you said he pulled the gun out.
Your responsible was okay. And then and then you said and
t.hen he pulled linaudible] dude in the back seat. vince
Meist.er said, rrRighl. I'
And then you said, rtI guess the individual in the
front seat told him you guys aren't going to need that' And he
turned around and supposedly this this is going to be
honest, this is what we he told me, he had the gun he had
the dude, Lhe other one
around and shot him and
the gun on the dude, he had the gun on
in the front seat pulled around, came
then from there he told me he shot back' "
You said that in the June 3, 2OI5 interview; is that
correcL?
A. No, I don't remember that
o. you don't remember that, but if we have a transcript
f rom ,fune 3, 2015, and I can do you want me to show it to
A. You can show it Lo me, buL I see how
you?
25

























MR. EVERSHED: Can I just approach, Your Honor?
THE COURT: You maY.
THE WITNESS: I don't remember that.
a. (BY l,IR. EVERSHED:) At the top of this does it sd!,
Detective .Tim Spangenberg, Detective Iinaudib]-el in prison,
,June 3, 20L5. And VM stands for Vince Meister, KC stands for
Kary Carter and in that on Lhis transcript I understand you
don't remember that, does that in fact State the words that I
just mentioned?
A. It does saY that.
O. okay.
A. I don't remember saying them'
o.Youhavenoreasontodisputethattranscript?
A. I just don't remember saying it'
MR.EVERSHED:okay.Allright.Nothingfurther.
THE COURT: RCCTOSS?





in prison togeLher after this happened, correcL?
A. Yeah.
A. Your re act.ualIY cellmates?
A. Yeah.
O. And you're in a wheelchair?25





































And he was Your ADA assistant?
Yeah.
He took care of You?
Yeah.
He is your caretaker?
Yeah.
And he's been fighting this case for 2 L/2 yeats?
Yeah.
And he talks to you about this case, he gives you all
of the details?
A. Never has he
A. What's that?
A. Never has he
O. He never has what?
A. We've never sat down and had a conversation'
O. You've never had a conversat,ion about this case?
A. NO
O. How did you get the information that you just
testified to?
A. linaudible] as far as what? My firearm, giving him
the firearm
a. You said he told you that he shot the guy
A. No. This is on the street' He werve never sat
down and had no conversation about the details, Ito, we have
KARY CARTER - Recross by MR. JOHNSON ffigrtA
not.
a. In a year as cel]mates you never had a conversation?
A. Never sat down linaudible].
a. AII right '
A. Not like that.
O. And and he had aII his legal work in there?
A. Never looked through it.
A. You never looked through his legal work?
A. Never.
O. Not when he went to the gYn?
A. Never.
O. Not when he went to the shower?
A. Never.
O. Not when he went to court?
A. Not one Lime.
O. Not when he went to the doctor?
A" How many times linaudible] I just told you'
Iinaudib]el one time'
O. You had access though?
A. It was in the room. Yeah, We're cellies. But no, I
have no
a. And your story evolved over time while you
guys from February t.he first time you talked, to 'fune' your
story evolved, right?
A.I,ikeIsaid,Iain'Lneverreadhispaperwork.

























O. and You had details.
A. Never read his PaPerwork.
O. Never read his PaPerwork?
A. NoPe.
o. How long did you guys know each other on the outside?
A. linaudible] known him since I was a kid'
O. So you've known him your whole life?
A. Yeah.
a. Known him your whole entire life, You guys never had
a conversation about this case while you're in prison together?
A. No, because honestly if we really had, T probably
wouldn't be up here. If we had, neither one of us wou]d be
here. He wouldn'L be here because then I knew the whole story
Iinaudible] .
a. So your testimony today is you have you have no
idea about the details of his case
A. No.
a. either from Lalking to him or from his paperwork
inthecellthatyouguyssharedtoget.herforayear.
A. Never ever read his paperwork/ never. Never sat down
to have a conversation about nothing'
A. Okay. Take your word for it' Thank you'
THE COURT: Redirect.
MR. EVERSHED: 'fust a moment'
Just a couPle questions '25
























THE COURT: Mr. Evershed, thank You.
REDIRECT EXAIUINATION
BY MR. EVERSTIED:
O. So l-ast time I was up here, Kdr!, we went over this
transcript.
A. Uh-huh.
o. where where you mentioned and then from there he
told you he shot back. okaY?
So did ,feremiah tell that to You?
A. This wasn't in this wasn'L in prison.
a. It wasn'L in prison. So you never had a conversation
wit.h him in Prison?
A. ft was never-
O. But you've had conversations you had a
conversation with him outside of prison?
A. That was one time.
A. OkaY. One Lime
A. linaudible] came over to him, just his self-defense,
that's why I t.old him it was self -defense.
O. Is that. when he tol-d you certain things that happened
in the car, about how he shot back?
A. I can'L remember that far back.
A. Okay. But iL wasn't so your testimony'
A. It was never was in Prison, no.
O. Okay. So your testimony is today he never told25


























you these t.hings in prison, it was outside of prison that you





nothing efse, Your Honor.
COIIRT: Okay. Any reason this witness should not
be excused. From the State?
MR. EVERSHED: No.
THE COURT: DCfCNSC?





courthouse, Mr. Carter. OkaY
break. Let.'s take a break.
Yourre excused from Lhe
. We'lI go ahead and take a
I want to remind the jurY not to




THE COI]RT: COUNSCI ,
MR. iIOHNSON: YCS.
seated for the jury
coul-d you approach?
(Bench Conference. )
THE COURT: I just
clear on t.he record, there was a
at a sidebar just. want Lo make
decision made bY defense
counsel to introduce the issue
MR. iIOHNSON: That he was in prison'
THE COURT: That he was in prison since the time of
the alleged crime. And I assume based upon seeing this that25
























was a decision you made after
client as part of a decision
witness?
consulting wit.h your Your
as to how to cross-examine this
MR. iIOHNSON: Correct.
THE COIIRT: Okay. I just wanted that to be clear.
MR. iIOHNSON: And because it came out three times
during ahead of time so'..
THE COURT: It terms of that went
MR. ,IOHNSON: Yeah, in terms of
THE COURT: fn your cross-examination'
MR. ,foHNsoNs -- before I made that decision, yeah.
THE COURT: And I didn't hear it come out on the
State's examination of the witness.
MR. EVERSHED: No. No. Nothing came out on the
State's
THECOURT:Okay.IjustwanLtomakesurethe
record is clear on that.
MR. iIoHNSON: Certainly. That this was not some kind
of mistake or issue like thaL, it was a strategic decision the
defense has made in consultation with the defendant ' Just
wanted the record to be clear on that, Lo make sure I'm noL
misunderstanding.
MR. EVERSHED: Since werre now talking about that and
since werre here, does this change the ana]ysis for Your Honor
and. for anyone else when it comes to that video?25
KARY CARTER - Redirect by MR. EVERSHED oggffe
Addendum C
Gun Exhibits
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Addendum D
Bloodstain Exhibits
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